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For the foregoing reasons I would from 
the of law for the of one year. 
Petitioners' application for a was denied June 6, 
1956, and the time for commencement of their suspension was 
extended to commence Angnst 15, 1956. Carter, ,J., was of 
the opinion that the petition should be 
[L. A. No. 23976. In Bank. 18, 
CESAR LAMBRETON, Petitioner, v. INDUSTRIAL ACCI-
DENT COMMISSION et 
[1] Negligence- Serious and Wilful Misconduct.- Serious and 
wilful misconduct means different from and much 
more than negligence, however gross; such misconduct is 
basically the antithesis of negligence, and the two types of 
behavior are mutually exclusive. 
[2a, 2b] Workmen's Compensation-Time to Make Claim-Effect 
of Amendment.-A workmen's compensation claim expressly 
stating that "the employer was grossly negligent" cannot serve 
as the basis for a later "amendment" setting forth a charge 
of serious and wilful misconduct which would an en-
tirely new and different on the where, 
at no time within 12 months from the date of was it 
See Cal.Jur., Negligence, § 
[2] See Cal.Jur., Workmen's 
Workmen's § 489. 
McK. Dig. References: 





date of injury" 
of the aggravated 
which constitutes serious 
which the employer cannot 
which he must himself defend. 
reason of serious and 
are cumulative rather than 
and are at least as different in essential 
facts and as are negligence and serious 
wilful misconduct. 
PHOCEEDING to review an order of the Industrial Acci-
dent Commission dismissing petitioner's claim for additional 
Order affirmed. 
Echmrd A. Sarkisian, Daniels, Elson & 
·unl''""'""' & and Milton H. Silverberg for 
in-
compensation, or action at 16 A.L.R. 620; 58 
A.L.R 1379; 68 A.L.R. 301. See also Cal.Jur., Workmen's Com-
,.~.Nuvwu, § 116; Am.Jur., Workmen's Compensation, § 199. 
that "The period within which may 
VC,;vULU''" for the collection of compensation 
serious and wilful misconduct of the em-
of section 4553, is as follows: 
'l'welve months from the date of injury. This period 
shall not be extended . . . the filing of application for 
benefits under other provisions of this division." 
Petitioner was on June 10, 1953. On July 13, 
he filed his attorney an application for com-
benefits on a printed form furnished by the com-
mission and entitled "Application for Adjustment of Claim." 
After the words alleging that petitioner ''sustained 
out of and in the course of the employment, 
as follows : '' the following was filled in : ''Punch press broke 
so that it punched twice in rapid succession," resulting in 
to 's right hand. The line starting with the 
words '' The reason for filing this claim is :'' was 
filled in: "Partial disability of claimant. Claimant alleges 
that was grossly negligent in maintenance of the 
press.'' 
The commission gave the parties notice of hearing for Sep-
tember which stated no issue of serious and wilful 
misconduct of the but by stipulation of the parties 
the matter was taken off calendar to be reset at the request 
c1f either On October 22, 1954, petitioner filed a 
substitution of On December 17, 1954, the new 
filed on petitioner's behalf a document entitled 
'' AMK~DJ\rEKT Interlineation) '' in which it was stated 
of the allegation that ''Claimant alleges that 
was negligent in maintenance of the press, 
. . . claimant alleges as follows :'' That on the date of 
injury, June 10, 1953, the employer "Bowers Mfg. Company 
operated and maintained a certain punch press in its place 
LAMBRETON INDUSTRIAL 
£4!1 C.2d 4llll; 297 P.2d Ill 
for in eases where an 
serious and wilful 
the employer and on 4, the nr<)ee.ea-
wc"''"'u'"" based on the asserted misconduct was ordered 
-.,-y~·~-··v has recovered and is now 
resume work and does not suffer from any peJrman1mt 
" At a in the 
502 LAMBRETON V. C.2d 
stated the sole issue was 
, ' and counsel for 
's counsel to elicit evidence 
shoring up the referee "That is not in issue. If you 
want to raise the you will have to do it.'' 
'' I think we should raise that'' ; the 
referee then ''Additional Issue 
caused serious and willful misconduct the 
and counsel for the stated that he would file a supple-
forth the basis on which misconduct 
was reference to certain safety 
orders. No supplemental was filed, and after 
several continuances the matter was ordered off calendar in 
1942. In 1946 it was again noticed for a "new" 
application was seemingly filed, an order was made that "the 
application will be considered as an amended application,'' 
an additional issue of ''statute of limitations'' was stated, 
and a hearing was had on all issues, including serious and 
wilful misconduct. Normal benefits were thereupon awarded, 
as well as an increased benefit based on the asserted mis-
conduct. On the for review the award 
of an increased benefit was annulled on the ground that, 
although "there is, and should be, liberality in the 
matter of amendments this amendment in 1946, bringing in 
a new and different issue which must be separately 'com-
menced,' could not relate back and be effective as of a date 
in 1941, in the face of the clear of section 5407 of 
the Labor Code. While considerable informality in proceed-
ings before the commission is permitted, and properly so, 
the meaning and effect of these statutory provisions cannot 
be entirely set aside, and some attempt must be made to 
comply with them and to raise issues in the manner and 
within the time there provided.'' (Pp. 359-360 of 81 Cal. 
App.2d.) 
In the Peterson case it would have been more nearly justi-
fiable than in the present one to the so-called amend-
ment stating misconduct, to relate back to the original date 
of filing the claim, inasmuch as there the employer was on 
specific notice within 12 months from the date of injury 
that the intended to claim serious and wilful mis-
conduct. In the present case, the claim 
not only did not state that serious and wilful misconduct 
was claimed but it stated that the ''employer was 
grossly negligent in maintenance of the press." [1] As 
503 
ho,wm;rf\1' gross ; such 
~Lvj>;Uj>;vJ.LvV; and the 
are exclusive. [2a] It fol-
vul;\uJ.<u claim could not serve as the basis for 
""'''""''"' forth a of serious and 
would impose an entirely new and 
liability on the employer. At no time within 
YYlnnu•" from the date of injury was it even suggested in 
that such a would be made. 
in reliance upon W ennerholm v. 
of Medicine (1942), 20 Cal.2d 
141 A.L.R 1358], (see also LeOyr v. Dow, 
462-463 [86 P.2d 900]), urges 
is indulged in by the courts in permitting 
am;onl.tillt:lll'"• and no reason appears why a proceeding before 
Industrial Accident Commission should be more techni-
In the W ennerholm ease the following appears : ''The 
of demurrer principally urged by the defend-
that the cause action is barred by the statute of 
This contention is based on the theory that the 
amended charging fraud states a new and 
.rliffer,ent cause of action from that for negligence stated in 
complaint. Unless the amended complaint sets 
an entirely different rouse action from the original, 
t"'""""'"".,. the amended complaint, for the purposes of the 
'l>ta~tu:te of must be deemed filed as of the date 
complaint. [Citations.] The modern rule, 
Glll."'ll'"'="u" is sought after the statute of limitations 
is that the amended complaint will be deemed filed 
date of the original complaint so long as recovery 
in each upon the same general set of facts. 
A mere · in legal tkeory will not subject 
cmnu.taun to the bar of the statute of limitations. 
In the case the only substantial differ-
between the factual situations set forth in the original and 
fifth amended complaint is that the former charged that 
were negligently made while the latter 
~--~,-,.,,~~that they were made with knowledge of their falsity. 
[46 C.2d 
nr,ocf~PfiJn['" before the Industrial Acci-
a claim for normal benefits and a claim for 
benefits by reason of serious and wilful misconduct 
upon the same general set of facts, nor do 
a difference or change in legal theory. 
is not the same; the legal liability is not 
the same and the "proceedings" to recover the benefits as 
are recognized as being different. (Lab. 
[4a] Normal benefits automatically follow 
from an within a covered employment relationship, 
whereas the additional award based on serious and wilful 
misconduct of the employer is an additional award which, 
denominated and regarded for administrative pur-
poses as ''increased compensation,' '1 is actually of the nature 
of a penalty, which is imposed only in "proceedings" com-
menced within '"fwelvc months from the date of injury" 
(Lab. § 5407), and only upon proof of the aggravated 
criminal or quasi-criminal behavior which constitutes serious 
and wilful misconduct, and against which the employer can-
not insurance. (1Jfe1·cer-Fraser Co. v. Industrial 
Ace. 0 om. ( 1953), sttpm, 40 Cal.2d 102, 108, 121, and authori-
ties there cited; Ins. Code, § 11661.) [5] Thus the two 
types of benefits are cumulative, rather than merely alterna-
and are at least as different in essential supporting facts 
and theory as are negligence and serious and wilful 
misconduct. As pointed out in Frost v. Witter (1901), 132 
Cal. 426 [64 P. 705, 84 Am.St.Rep. 53], "for the purpose 
of whether amendment is possible, the 'cause of 
action' referred to as furnishing the test means only the legal 
obligation which it is sought to enforce against the defendant." 
(Klopgtock v. Court (1941), 17 Oal.2d 13, 20 [108 
P.2d 906, 135 A.L.R. 318].) [2b] Here, as shown above, the 
1Such was deemed necessary in order to sustain jurisdiction 
in the Accident Commission to make the additional award. 
(E. Clemens Horst Co. v. Industrial Ace. Com. (1920), 184 Cal. 180, 
192-193 [193 P. 105, 16 A.L.R. 611}.) 
L.AMBBETON v. INDUSTRIAL Aoo. CoM. 505 
[46 C.2d 498; 29'7 P.2d 91 
UUUp:;CW>.V» to pay normal benefits is one obligation, while 
to pay additional compensation by reason of serious 
wilful misconduct is an entirely distinct and further 
From what has been said, it follows that a claim 
alleging gross negligence not only does not con-
the commencement of proceedings to collect additional 
co:ro:pE~nsltticm based on the statutorily defined misconduct of 
but implicitly negatives existence of a basis 
proceedings. Hence, the commission, bound by the 
as are we, correctly held that the misconduct issue 
was raised too late. 
[4b] The employer points out, further, that under the 
""'''vil<1mls of sections 3756 through 3759 of the Labor Code 
also Ins. Code, § 11662) 2 the insurer will be substituted 
of the employer and the latter dismissed, in proceed-
for normal benefits, whereas the employer must himself 
·ut:.Lc.u.u. against a claim for extra benefits based on his alleged 
misconduct, against which, as already mentioned herein, he 
cannot insure. The legal liabilities or obligations for the two 
of benefits are thus again shown to be essentially differ-
( See KZopstock v. S1tperior Court (1941), s'!tpra, 17 Cal. 
20.) 
reason of our conclusion that the commission correctly 
um·LU""'c"'u. the proceeding for additional compensation on the 
rrPrmn.rl of serious and wilful misconduct because the so-called 
was filed more than 12 months from the date 
of injury, no useful purpose would be served by discussing 
points raised by the employer. 
The order of dismissal is affirmed. 
J., Traynor, J., Spence, J., and McComb, J., con-
CARTER, J.-I dissent. 
The majority opinion applies technical rules of pleading 
a situation where such rules are clearly inapplicable, and 
"Insurance Code, section 11662: "Whenever any employer :is :insured 
against liability for compensation with any insurer, sueh insurer is sub-
rogated to the rights of the employer to recover losses arising out of 
of the following aets by the insurer: 
Assuming the liability of the employer for eompensation :in 
the manner provided by the law relating thereto. 
'' Payment of any compensation for which the employer is liable. 
''Such insurer may enforce any sueh subrogated rights :in its own 
name.'' 
C.2d 
for a compensable 
to the facts justifying 
was grossly negli-
press which resulted 
amendment in "\Yhich he 
in detail; the amend-
from the date of 
4553 of tl1e I-1abor Code. In my 
not necessary to raise the issue 
of wilful misconduct as such issue was in the language 
tontained in the The only purpose the 
amendment served was to particularize the mis-
conduct. Hence the time of the amendment is 
holds tl1at the statement in the original appli-
cation was not sufficient to raise the wilful misconduct issue 
and that thus the amendment stated a new cause of action 
which was barred section 4553. 
Section 5500 of the Labor Code provides that: "The appli-
cation shall be in and shall state the general nature 
of any controversy concerning compensation or any right or 
liability arising out of or incidental thereto and over which 
jnrisdiction is vrsted law in the commission.'' The rules 
of the commission state that a charge of wilful misconduct 
should be with some particularity but the only sanc-
tion for the failure to so state the case is that it is grounds 
Admin. Code, tit. 8, § 10700.) The 
workmen's laws must be liberally construed 
with the purpose of extending the benefits for the protection 
of persons in the conrse of their employment. (Lab. 
Code, § 3202.) The in workmen's compensation 
proceedings are to be construed and need not adhere 
to rnles of in ordinary court procedure. 
(DeMartini v. Industrial Ace. 90 Cal.App.2d 139, 148 
[202 P.2d .) 
Here we have the that the press was grossly 
negligmtly maintaineil. rrhat was sufficient to advise the 
hili carrier that more than ordinary compensa-
tion was 
less of fault of the 
XX, § 21; I1ab. 
compensation is recoverable regard-
or employee. (Cal. Const., art. 




an amendment which 






that therefore the 
the amended siawte of limitations lwd not run 
was filed after the limitation Here a change 
of gros::; in the maintenance of the 
pn''"' to vvilful misconduct in the maintcnauec of the press 
llcws not constitute stai ing a new eause of action. 
opinion of the Distriet Comt of Seeoud Dis-
triet. Division Three, l\Ir. ,Jnstiec pro 
tempore, ably disposes of this case I 
of di:ssent as follows 
"Petitioner challrnges as excess 
of Industrial Aceident Commission to consider his 
claim to increased compensation for an industrial accident 
basr•d uvon an of allJ wilful misconduct of 
the '!'hat is the only in the case. Employer 
and employee are within the \Vorkmen 's Act, 
the was a compensable one, and the normal compen-
sation due petitioner has been without to 
the daim now before us. 
"Petitioner received an 
filed an application for 
13, and an amendment thereto 
'rlw application was made upon a 
the commission. At the line 
\Vas Heceived' it says 'Punch 
his hand on June 10, 
of his claim on ,T uly 
on December 17, 1H54. 
form providerl by 
with 'Bxplain How 
press broke so that it 
508 LAMBRETON v. INDUSTRIAL Ace. CoM. [46 C.2d 
uu•~uvu twice in rapid succession.' And paragraph 11, 'The 
reason for filing this claim is:' was filled in as follows: 'Partial 
permanent disability of claimant. Claimant alleges that 
employer was grossly negligent in maintenance of the press.' 
The printed prayer reads: 'Wherefore, It is requested that 
a time and place be fixed for hearing and notice given, and 
that an order or award be made granting such relief as the 
party or parties may be entitled to.' Hearing was set for 
September 21, 1953, and later taken off calendar by stipula-
tion. On December 17, 1954, petitioner filed a document 
entitled 'Amendment (By Interlineation)' which reads as 
follows: 'Whereas serious and wilful misconduct has been 
alleged by claimant in his application for adjustment filed 
with the above commission, July 9th, 1953, and it is claimant's 
desire to amend said allegation with regard to serious and 
wilful misconduct, and in said application it is set forth as 
follows: ''Claimant alleges that employer was grossly negli-
gent in maintenance of the press,'' that in the place and 
stead of said allegation claimant alleges as follows: L That 
on or about June lOth, 1953, the respondent Bowers Mfg. 
Company operated and maintained a certain punch press in 
its place of manufacturing in violation of section 3601 (b) 
Title 8, of the California Adminisgration Code, in thay all 
points of operation guards were not properly set up, adjusted 
or maintained in safe and efficient working order. II. That 
as a proximate result of said serious and wilful misconduct of 
said respondant, the claimant, Cesar Lambreton while work-
ing within the course and scope of his employment, suffered 
personal injuries and damage of a permanant nature, to-wit: 
Loss of part of middle finger right hand and paralysis of index 
finger of right hand. WHEREFORE IT IS PRAYED that in addi-
tion to his award, that respondants be assessed extradordinary 
damages for serious and wilful misconduct.' As this filing was 
more than one year after date of injury the commission held 
that the claim of serious and wilful misconduct of the em-
ployer was barred by Labor Code, section 5407 and dismissed 
the .same. 
''Section 4553 Labor Code provides: 'The amount of com-
pensation otherwise recoverable shall be increased one-half 
where the employee is injured by reason of the serious and 
wilful misconduct of any of the following: (a) The employer, 
or his managing representative. . . . But such increase of 
award shall in no event exceed three thousand seven hundred 
LAMBRETON v. INDUSTRIAL Ace. CoM. 509 
[46 C.2d 498; 297 P.2d 9] 
dollars ( $3,750).' And section 5407: 'The period 
which may be commenced proceedings for the collec-
tion of compensation on the ground of serious and wilful 
of the employer, under provisions of section 4553, 
is follows: Twelve months from the date of injury. 
This period shall not be extended by payment of compensation, 
therefor, or the filing of application for compensa-
tion benefits under other provisions of this division.' 
"The theory of the commission and of the employer, as 
is that a charge of gross negligence is the anti-
of serious and wilful misconduct and hence the amend-
ment of December 17, 1954, was the first charge of such mis-
and, being filed more than a year after the accident, 
came too late. Petitioner's counsel take the position that the 
said document was but an amendment of a defective but 
amendable allegation in the original application and that it 
tlwrrfore dates back to the time of original filing on July 13, 
J 953. Respondents do not challenge the applicability to com-
pensation proceedings of this doctrine of relation; they merely 
take the position that there was no basis for an amendment 
and hence no room for application of the relation rule. This 
case thus reduces itself to a question of whether we deal 
with a mere variance or a complete departure in pleading. 
"'l'here are certain rules relating to court actions which 
the way to a correct decision here. And it must be 
as a mere truism that proceedings before the com-
mission are attended by less, not more, formality than those 
in conrt of law. Sections 5708 and 5709, Labor Code, so 
declare in substance. 
"Hespondents rely primarily on lJ!ercer-Fraser Co. v. In-
dusln'al Ace. Com., 40 Cal.2d 102 [251 P.2d 955], a case in 
which an award of increased compensation for serious and 
wilful misconduct was annulled for insufficiency of the evi-
which showed negligence and fell short of proof of such 
misconduct. In so doing the court discussed the difference 
between negligence and wilful misconduct, saying at page 
120: 'Rather, the true rule is that serious and wilful mis-
conduct is basically the antithesis of negligence, and that the 
two of behavior are mutually exclusive; an act which is 
negligent and consequently devoid of either an inten-
tion to do harm or of knowledge or appreciation of the fact 
that danger is likely to result therefrom cannot at the same 
time constitute wilful misconduct; conversely an act de lib-
510 [46 C.2d 
express purpose of injuring another, or 
either with knowledge that serious 
result or with a positive, active, wanton, 
reckless and absolute of its possibly damaging 
consequences, cannot be classed as the less culpable 
conduct which termed It follows that a finding 
wilful misconduct cannot be sustained upon 
of It also quoted from 
, Cal.2d P.2d 194], as follows: 
' "'While the line between gross negligence and wilful mis-
conduct may not be easy to draw, a distinction appears 
. . . in that gross is merely such a lack of care 
as may be to indicate a passive and indifferent atti-
tude towards while wilful misconduct involves a more 
""'"'..-'"'" intent actually to harm another or to do an act with 
a active and absolute disregard of its consequences.'' ' 
This Mercer-Fraser case involved no problem of amendment 
and, so far as here applicable, holds only that gross negligence 
is not the equivalent of serious and wilful misconduct. Ours 
is a different question, whether a charge of gross negligence 
affords basis for an amendment to allege wilful misconduct 
under the circumstances presented by the record at bar. 
"It must be recognized that section 4553, in providing in-
creased compensation for wilful misconduct, does not create 
a separate cause of action or claim. This was determined 
by E. Clemens Horst Co. v. Industrial Ace. Corn., 184 Cal. 
180 [193 P. 105, 16 A.L.R. 611]. The constitutionality of 
the Compensation Act was there challenged and it was 
claimed that the provision for such additional award was 
unconstitutional because the Constitution empowered the Leg-
islature to do no more than provide for 'compensation' for 
and that the addition of a penalty for 
wilful misconduct was not embraced by that term. At page 
192 the court said: 'This language does not authorize the 
creation of a liability for anything more than compensation. 
If the fifty per cent to be added in cases where the injury 
is caused the willful misconduct of the employer is given 
as a penalty for such misconduct, and not as compensation to 
the for his , the provision is not within the 
to the said section, and if it has 
hP,rrm,r~ the legislative power and void.' 
to be presumed the legislature 
by loss of earnings and other 
L 
of 1 claim may be so increased. 
''Cases dealing with amendments 
tht· correct answer. Great is 
of amendment to the end that lawsuits 
upon their merits. 
J [108 P.2d 906, 1~13 
10:?. CaL 421, 424 [ G4 P. 
128 Cal.App.2cl 
Jfirschhorn, 112 CaLApp. 
ll 
the solution of every problem of whether a new cause of acti011 
Jws been inserted amendment after the of the 
statnte of limitation must be solved to the spe· 
cilk facts a correct of wlJat cousi rtutes a cause 
of ndion. A cause of action is the to secnrc redress for 
yiolation of an obligation to the claimant. Iu ](lop. 
stock v. Sttperior Conrt, supra, 17 Cal.2d at page 20: 'In 
whether a different cause of aetion is 
inlrocluced by the amendment teehnieal considerations or 
aneic'nt formulae are not more is meant 
tlmu that the defendant not be to <m::m-er a wholly 
di'Terent legal liability or from that originally 
stn As the court says iu the Frost ease p. 426), 
for the purpose of determining whether ame11dment is pos-
the "cause of aetion" referred as to furnishing the 
test means only the legal which it is sought to 
ell against the defendant. Other eourts have used almost 
iclentical language; the test is not >Yhethcr under technical 
rules of pleading a new eause of action i,; int rodueed, but 
the test is whether an is made to state faets 
512 LAMBRETON v. INDUSTRIAL 1\.cc. CoM. [46 C.2d 
which rise to a wholly distinct and different legal obli-
gation against the defendant. The power to permit amend-
ment is denied only if a change is made in the liability sought 
to be enforced against the defendant. (See Harr1:ss v. Tams, 
258 N.Y. 229, 242 [179 N.E. 476] .) ' Day v. Western Loan 
& mdg. Co., 42 Cal.App.2d 226, 231 [108 P.2d 702] : 'It is 
well-settled that, where the orig·inal complaint has been filed 
within the statutory period, an amended complaint may be 
filed after the statute has run as long as it does not state a 
new or different cause of action from that appearing in the 
original complaint. Stated another way, if the original 
complaint defectively states a cause of action, it may be 
amended after the running of the statute as long as the cause 
of action stated in the amended pleading can trace its descent 
from the original pleading.' 
"Wennerholm v. Stanford University Seh. of Med., 20 Cal. 
2d 713 [128 P.2d 522, 141 A.L.R. 1358], was an action against 
manufacturers, distributors, and dispensers of certain drugs 
for personal injuries caused by use of same. The first four 
complaints charged negligence; the fifth amended complaint 
shifted to fraud. Judgment sustaining demurrer thereto 
without leave to amend was reversed. At page 717: 'The 
ground of general demurrer principally urged by the defend-
ants is that the cause of action is barred by the statute of 
limitations. This contention is based on the theory that the 
fifth amended complaint charging fraud states a new and 
different cause of action from that for negligence stated in 
the original complaint. Unless the amended complaint sets 
forth an entirely different cause of action from the original, 
however, the amended complaint, for the purposes of the 
statute of limitations, must be deemed filed as of the date 
of the original complaint. [Citing cases.] The modern rule, 
where amendment is sought after the statute of limitations 
has run, is that the amended complaint will be deemed filed 
as of the date of the original complaint so long as recovery is 
sought in each complaint upon the same general set of facts. 
[Citing cases.] A mere change in legal theory will not sub-
ject the amended complaint to the bar of the statute of limi-
tations. (Citing cases.] In the present case the only substantial 
difference between the factual situation set forth in the origi-
nal and the fifth amended complaint is that the former charged 
that the representations were negligently made while the 
latter charges that they were made with knowledge of their 
falsity. Despite the change in legal theory from an action 
513 
it cannot be that an 
cause of is stated. Therefore the 
is not barred by the statute of limitations.' 
the amendment at bar 'can trace its descent 
v-~.J,5 "~""'- pleading' and be said to involve the 'same 
geru:u·•'n set facts' as the That docu-
was a printed form by the commission. At the 
of the page in small capital letters it says 
T'l'l'(ivnnoJ1~< of the '\Vorkmen's Compensation Insurance and 
Laws, applicant need only state the nature 
claim in controversy. . . . ' This the applicant did 
he said 'Punch press broke so that it punched twice in 
succession.' Of course, no charge of fault or negligence 
necessary to or expected in such an application. When 
attorney included in the 'reason for filing this 
a statement that 'Claimant alleges that employer was 
negligent in maintenance of the press' he served 
that something more than compensation payable regard-
of fault would be sought. And the printed prayer 'That 
an order or award made granting such relief as the party 
or may be entitled to' was broad enough to sustain 
an award of increased compensation if perchance gross negli-
would afford ground for such an award in point of 
Obviously the application was defective but, fairly 
liberally construed, it did give notice of a claim for 
coiJape:nsfttio,n additional to the normal amount payable with-
It was aimed, as were the later allegations of 
misconduct, at increased compensation which was but 
,,~,~.,,,u,ou" to, a part of the basic claim. (E. Clemens Horst 
v. lndmtrial Ace. Com., S1tpra, 184 Cal. 180, 192-193.) 
fact that it was inexpertly phrased does not deprive 
it of all value as a basis for informed amendment. When 
facts are the same a shifting from one theory of 
to another is not the substitution of a new canse of 
(Oberkotter v. Woolman, 187 Cat 500, 504 [202 
; Wennerkolm v. StanfMd University Sck. of Med., 
20 CaL2d 713, 718; Barr v. Carroll, supra, 128 Cal. 
.<UJ'IJ·"''u 23, 33-34.) The absence of a vital allegation in an 
complaint, resulting in the statement of no eanse 
action at all, does not preclude an amendment to incorporate 
indispensable element of the action. The correct view 
well stated in 2 Witkin's California Procedure, section 606, 
1619: 'If the original complaint fails to state a cause 




same cause of action; there is no 
nature of the case and therefore no surprise 
to the defendant. Rauer's Law etc. Co. v. 
well ( 1909), 11 494, 495 [ 105 P. 427] ; Ruiz v. 
Barbara Oas etc. Co. (1912), 164 Cal. 188, 194 [128 
; Woods v. Cook (1936), 14 Cal.App.2d 560, 562 [58 
, § 613.) ' Both original application and 
amendment count upon an accident of June 10, 1953, occur-
at the premises of the employer Bowers Manufacturing 
and resulting in loss of part of middle finger of 
right hand and paralysis of index finger of right 
hand. The gross negligence was alleged to relate to 'mainte-
nance of the press,' and the wilful misconduct to the same 
but more elaborately 'That on or about June lOth, 1953, 
Bowers Mfg. Company operated and main-
tained a certain punch press in its place of manufacturing in 
violation of section 3601 (b) 'l'itle 8, of the California Admin-
isgration Code, in thay all points of operation guards were 
not properly set up, adjusted or maintained in safe and effi-
eient order.' 
"EatweU v. Beck, 41 Cal.2d 128, 135-136 [257 P.2d 643], 
affords a persuasive analogy. That was an action for deceit. 
Of course, fraud without damage is not actionable at law 
and such an averment is essential to a good complaint. 
v. Ji'ishb~trn, 183 Cal. 206, 220 [190 P. 808]; Maynes 
Mesa Lancl Co., 10 Cal.2d 587, 590 [76 P.2d 109]; 
12 § 69, p. 813.) 'l'he exclusive measure of Eatwell's 
recovery was his out-of-pocket loss under section 3343, Civil 
Code ; he had alleged certain damage which was not recover-
able ; confronted by motion for nonsuit he sought leave to 
reopen and to amend his complaint to aver the proper clam-
ages. 'l'his was denied and held to be erroneous. An amend-
ment to incorporate a proper allegation was held to be 
proper and indeed not to be denied. See also ruling of this 
court in Srnith v. Los Angeles Bookbinders Union, 133 Cal. 
App.2d 495 [284 P.2d 194]. 
'' 'l'his procedural liberality was applied to a compensation 
ease in National Auto. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Industrial Ace. Corn., 
!15 Cal.App.2d 10 [212 P.2d 1]. In that instance the appli-
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[46 C.2d 498; 297 P.2d 9] 
"'n'"''''nlna which contention court said: 'But 
need be said about the claimed variance. The commis-
not bound strict rules of 
record demonstrates 
it was obvious that 
<Jt::t•u"•CJu<a was upon of a ""'""A"'' 
as well as the claimed infection of the arm as the cause 
It was petitioners' witnesses who that 
was caused by thrombophlebitis and not by the arm 
and it was also petitioners' witnesses who 
such condition was aggravated by overwork. Petitioners 
not surprised by this theory. Although it would have 
better practice to have moved to amend to conform to 
the failure to do so was a mere which does 
not invalidate the award. (Lab. Code, § 5709.)' 
l:tesp·on•ctellts rely heavily upon Peterson v. Indttstrial Ace. 
81 Cal.App.2d 352 [183 P.2d 927], but we do not 
it opposed in any respect to the views herein ex-
In that case the application gave no intimation of 
claim other than normal compensation. At the u~""""' 
referee saw that wilful misconduct was ""''""''"~"n 
told counsel for claimant he would have to amend 
order to make that claim, gave to do and 
s11~~~este:d : 'Additional Issue. 'Vas caused 
serious and wilful misconduct The 
"n''""'"'' also told counsel it would be necessary to file a 
application and was told that that would be done. 
was on December 4, 1941; after various 
other delays the matter was heard on 
than four years later. No amended or 
been filed until April an order 
uc•ouLLli" this 1946 to be an amendment 
and an increased award was made on the 
misconduct. In annulling it the court 
that there was no claim on file which could form a 
that an amendment 
516 LAMBRETON v. INDUSTRIAL Ace. CoM. [46 C.2d 
'would not suffice to raise the issue and that a written amend-
ment filed more than four years after the accident came too 
late. The court said at page 357: 'While a claim for both 
sorts of benefits may well be included in a single application, 
the language of section 5407 indicates an intention that 
some definite step, other and different from the filing of a 
general application, must be taken to raise an issue of wilful 
misconduct, and that an application setting up only the 
ordinary issues shall not be sufficient for that purpose. The 
respondents contend that sections 4553 and 5407 contain no 
provisions as to how such a proceeding for the raising of 
such an issue shall be commenced, whereas sections 5500 and 
5501 provide for the application on the ordinary issue. The 
latter sections are contained in a chapter devoted to pleading 
and it is nowhere stated therein that they relate only to 
applications on the ordinary issues. Section 5500 states that 
the application shall be in writing and shall state the general 
nature of the controversy concerning compensation, or any 
right or liability arising out of or incidental thereto. This 
would seem to have been intended to apply to both of these 
kinds of issue. In any event the original application here 
merely set forth as the cause of the injury that a cave-in 
resulted because the walls of the excavation were not properly 
shored up. It also stated the only question presented as 
being whether or not the applicant had entirely recovered or 
had suffered permanent disability. That this was the only 
issue raised was recognized by the referee at the first hearing 
and concurred in by all parties. In our opinion, the appli-
cation as originally filed was not sufficient to raise the willful 
misconduct issue.' And at 359 : 'The hearing leading to the 
award here in question was then held, based on the new 
application thus deemed to be an amendment to the original 
application, on the theory that it related back to the date 
of filing the original application. While there is, and should 
be, great liberality in the matter of amendments this amend-
ment in 1946, bringing in a new and different issue which 
must be separately "commenced," could not relate back and 
be effective as of a date in 1941, in the face of the clear 
provisions of section 5407 of the Labor Code. While consider-
able informality in proceedings before the commission is 
permitted, and properly so, the meaning and effect of these 
statutory provisions cannot be entirely set aside, and some 
attempt must be made to comply with them and to raise 
issues in the manner and within the time there provided. We 
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in award 'Which is here m 
' The case did not deal with our and is not 
commission's reliance npon its rule 10700 
tit. 8, § 10700) is of no avail. It sets 
for a of serious and wilful mis-
in an application, concluding as follows: Fail-
state tho basis of the claim of serious and wilful 
with the particularities herein provided, unless 
waived by the adverse partie::;, may be grounds 
eontinuanee.' Continuance of hearing, nut dismissal, is 
for failure to plead wilful misconduct with the 
required by the rule.'' 
foregoing reasons I would annul 'the order. 
Petitioner's application for a rehearing by the Supreme 
Court was denied ,June 12, 1956. Gibson, C. J., Carter, J., and 
J., ·were of the opinion that the application should 
[L.A. No. 23697. In Bank. May 22, 1956.] 
BENE:B'ICIAL FIRE ~1\.ND C~I\.SUALTY INSUHANCE 
COMPANY (a Corporation), Respondent, v. KUR'l' 
III'rKE AND COMPANY, INC. (a Corporation), Ap-
pellant. 
[1] Insurance-Agency for Insurer-Actions-Offer of Proof.--
an action by an insurance company against a general 
for declaration of rights under a written contract relat-
to the agent's compensation, where the trial court had 
previously indicated that it would receive no extrinsic evi-
dence of any kind bearing on construction of the contract, 
defendant's offer of proof that the parties construed the con-
tract to mean that sums paid monthly to defendant were fully 
that plaintiff never demanded a return of such sums 
they showed in a deficit position, and that under trade 
custom and usage earned commissions are never returnable, 
sufficient, though general and somewhat vague. 
lYicK. Dig. References: [1, 3] Insurance, § 33; [2] Appeal and 
Error, § 184; [4] Evidence, § 414; [5] Evidence, § 399; [6] Evi-
§ 410; [7] Contracts, § 161; [8] Usages and Customs, § 6. 
